The market for asset tokenization and global structured credit is facing a shift that few clearly anticipated: the pressure on private credit funds in the U.S. is no longer a latent risk but has become an ongoing event.

In 2026, major banks such as JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Barclays began actively exercising their asset devaluation rights, known as mark-downs, on fund portfolios that had been financed with generous leverage for years.

The practical result? Managers being forced to exchange guarantees, renegotiate terms, and rethink structures that seemed solid.

More than just a market event, this movement exposes structural weaknesses in operations that grew too fast without adequate governance support.

Neste artigo, analisamos os mecanismos por trás dessa pressão, o que motivou os bancos a agir agora e o que esse cenário revela sobre governança e infraestrutura em crédito estruturado.

What are private credit funds in the US?

Private credit funds in the US are investment vehicles that grant loans directly to companies, bypassing the traditional banking system.

They occupy a space that has grown substantially in the last decade, especially in the United States, where stricter regulations on banks have created pent-up demand for financing that the private market has begun to supply.

Unlike conventional fixed-income funds, which invest in government bonds or debentures traded on the exchange, private credit funds in the US operate in less liquid markets, with bilateral contracts and assets that do not have daily pricing in the secondary market.

This characteristic offers the potential for higher returns, but also implies less transparency and greater operational complexity.

It is precisely the absence of traceability and real-time monitoring that transforms operational opacity into systemic risk, and it is at this point that infrastructures like BLOCKBR’s, by digitizing the representation of assets and their associated flows, create a layer of transparency that operations structured on legacy systems simply do not possess.

In Brazil, structures similar to include the FIDCs, securitization companies and managed private credit portfolios, segments that closely follow the developments in the North American -American as a benchmark for maturity and systemic risk.

How do private credit funds work in the US?

In the US, private credit funds operate under different legal formats, with BDCs (Business Development Companies) and closed-end funds being the most common.

They raise funds from institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, and family offices, and allocate them to loans to medium-sized companies, often in leveraged buyout or corporate finance transactions.

The return dynamics of these funds depend on two main factors: the quality of the loans originated and the strategic use of leverage to increase available capital.

It is precisely this second element that lies at the heart of the current crisis.

To understand the magnitude of the market: the largest US banks revealed, in 2026, a combined exposure of approximately US$180 billion to private credit companies.

JPMorgan estimated its individual portfolio at $50 billion; Wells Fargo reported $36.2 billion; and Citigroup declared $22 billion in exposure, figures that explain why the topic has become a priority for CEOs of the world’s largest banks.

What is the role of reverse leverage in these structures?

Reverse leverage, technically called a subscription line facility or NAV facility, depending on the structure, is the mechanism by which banks lend capital to private credit funds in the US using the fund’s own asset portfolio as collateral.

In practice, the fund presents its corporate loans as collateral and obtains a bank line of credit that multiplies its investment power.

This model was extremely profitable for both sides for years. Banks profited from spreads on credit lines; funds increased their returns by reinvesting leveraged capital.

The problem arises when the assets given as collateral lose value, either due to deterioration of the borrowers or sectoral revaluation, as is happening now with software companies exposed to disruption by artificial intelligence.

When a bank exercises its mark-down right, it formally reduces the value it assigns to a specific asset within the collateral portfolio.

This reduces the available collateral, which may trigger margin calls and force the manager to inject capital, reduce leverage, or the most common option at this time exchange the depreciated asset for another considered safer by the lending bank.

Why are banks undervaluing private credit fund assets in the US?

The short answer is: because the macroeconomic and sectoral environment has changed rapidly enough to turn previously acceptable risks into risks that need to be actively managed.

The most accurate answer involves a combination of mutually reinforcing factors in 2026.

Firstly, turbulence in global markets increased the correlation between assets that, in the original model, were treated as independent.

Diversified corporate loan portfolios have begun to show synchronized deteriorating trends, especially in sectors such as software, digital services, and companies with knowledge-intensive business models, all on a collision course with AI-driven automation.

Furthermore, banks identified that some funds were using leverage not only to amplify returns, but also to manage short-term liquidity, covering investor redemptions with leveraged capital.

This usage creates a concentration risk that creditors were unwilling to continue absorbing without repricing.

What motivated JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Barclays to act?

The three banks mentioned, JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Barclays, are among the largest providers of reverse leverage in the market.

Their decision to exercise markdown rights was neither simultaneous nor coordinated, but reflects a common understanding of the timing of the credit cycle.

In the case of JPMorgan, the move gained visibility when it became public that the bank had reduced lending to some funds and decreased the value of certain assets in collateral portfolios. Jamie Dimon, the bank’s CEO, was direct in a conference call with investors: “We’ve always had what we call markup rights to analyze the underlying guarantees. And that’s a right that protects us.”

The bank operates with a specific logic: it offers relatively lower interest rates on leverage, but in return demands broader rights to adjust collateral valuations, and can act more quickly than competitors.

According to market participants, JPMorgan may reduce the value of a debt if the borrower reports declining profits or if loan yields fall short of expectations.

Goldman Sachs and Barclays have adopted their own approaches, with variations in the triggers and dispute mechanisms.

This asymmetry between banks is relevant: institutions with stronger contestation rights will be better positioned if default rates in private credit start to escalate, representing a concrete competitive advantage in a stress scenario.

An important detail: some interest rates charged on leverage already exceed 3 percentage points above the SOFR rate, an increase of 50 to 150 basis points compared to what was previously practiced. This direct repricing reduces the funds’ margins and puts pressure on the returns promised to investors.

How does banking pressure affect fund managers?

For private credit fund managers in the US, the current scenario combines two simultaneous pressures: on one hand, banks tightening leverage conditions; on the other, investors requesting redemptions in increasing volumes, concerned about asset quality and exposure to sectors vulnerable to AI disruption.

Faced with a mark -down in the banking sector, the manager has essentially three options:

• Reduce the volume of loans in the fund, thereby decreasing total leverage;
• To contribute equity or capital from shareholders to cover the difference in collateral;
• Swap the devalued asset for another one accepted by the bank as adequate collateral.

The third option has been the most widely used, as it is less costly in the short term. However, it is not neutral: it requires the manager to have sufficiently high-quality substitute assets, liquidity to carry out the exchange, and contractual agreements that allow for this flexibility.

Not all funds have all three of these conditions simultaneously.

There is also a significant reputational impact. Managers who have been forced to exchange collateral or renegotiate terms with banks are being monitored more closely by institutional investors.

In an environment where the impact of tokenization on funds of investments is already being discussed as a structural alternative, the operational credibility of a manager becomes an asset in its own right.

Ted Pick, CEO of Morgan Stanley, captured the moment well: private credit is going through an “adolescent phase.”In this context, both lenders and borrowers are being scrutinized with heightened attention. This scrutiny will not diminish; on the contrary, it is likely to intensify as more performance data is reported.

What is the size of the exposure of large banks to private credit?

The figures released in 2026, along with the quarterly results of the largest US banks, were significant enough to stir regulatory and institutional debate:

• JPMorgan Chase: portfolio estimated at US$50 billion in exposure to private credit funds in the US;
• Wells Fargo: $36.2 billion in loans to private credit funds in the US in the first quarter of 2026;
• Citigroup: $22 billion in reported exposure, with a history of zero losses over the life of the portfolio.

Adding just these three together, the total exceeds US$108 billion, part of a total sector exposure that reaches approximately US$180 billion among the largest banks. To put this in context: we are talking about a significant portion of a market that moved around US$1.8 trillion in private loans to companies throughout the American economy.

Despite its magnitude, leaders like Jamie Dimon have publicly stated that they are not “particularly concerned” about this portfolio, provided that contractual protections are rigorously enforced.

This stance, more than reassuring, is revealing: it confirms that banks believe their protection mechanisms are sufficient, provided they are applied proactively.

The risk, therefore, falls on those on the other side of the table: the fund managers with less responsiveness.

What does this movement reveal about governance and infrastructure in structured operations?

Beyond market dynamics, the episode of bank markdowns exposes something that structured credit professionals know well, but which is rarely discussed with the necessary clarity: the quality of operational infrastructure and contractual governance is a determining factor of resilience in times of stress.

Funds that grew rapidly during the private credit expansion cycle often prioritized volume and return at the expense of robust governance structures.

Leveraged contracts were negotiated without adequate dispute clauses, and without clear limits on the unilateral exercise of mark-downs. and without well-defined mechanisms for replacing guarantees. When the cycle turned, these weaknesses became concrete liabilities.

This is where infrastructures like BLOCKBR come in. Structured operations with real governance are not based solely on good contracts; they depend on a technological and operational foundation that allows for monitoring assets, tracking flows, and responding quickly when the environment changes.

The absence of this foundation is not merely an inefficiency: it is a risk factor that manifests itself precisely when the operation most needs control.

The case of Blue Owl Capital is illustrative in this regard. The firm’s main fund, Blue Owl Credit Income Corp., chose not to leverage JPMorgan, structuring its credit lines with nine other banks under contracts with varying degrees of discretion in asset revaluation.

This decision to diversify counterparties and to structure contracts more carefully is proving to be strategic.

The same principle applies to the Brazilian context. Structures such as FIDCs, CRIs, CRAs, and securitization operations depend on a infrastructure legal, technological and operational that support not only the day-to-day operation, but especially those situations involving stress.

The tokenization of assets, in this context, it is not merely a technological innovation, it is an layer of additional traceability, transparency, and efficiency that can strengthen the governance of structured operations.

There are three elements that this episode highlights for any structured credit operation:

• Contractual governance: the rights to reassess guarantees need to be negotiated clearly, with well-defined dispute mechanisms and limits on unilateral exercise;
• Diversification of counterparties: excessive reliance on a single leverage provider creates a concentration of risk that can be devastating during times of adjustment;
• Operational infrastructure: the ability to monitor, report, and replace assets in a timely manner depends on systems and processes that need to be ready before the stress, not during.

For managers and developers operating in Brazil, the American scenario functions as a real-time risk laboratory.

The same dynamics—leverage, sector concentration, and contract fragility—can manifest themselves in local private credit operations, especially as the Brazilian market grows and attracts more sophisticated institutional capital.

BLOCKBR, as an asset tokenization infrastructure for the regulated financial market, closely monitors these global trends.

Not because it offers private credit products, but because the quality of the infrastructure that supports structured operations, from legal to technological, from compliance to back-office, is precisely what differentiates resilient operations from fragile operations.

If you structure, distribute, or operate private credit, understanding how to strengthen your governance and infrastructure is no longer optional; it’s what separates resilient operations from those that break under pressure.

Learn about the infrastructure of BLOCKBR and see how to build structured operations using the standard that the new cycle of the market requires.